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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOLBROOK COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No,
14005

vs.
STANLEY S. ADAMS, VON H.
WHITBY, TONY M. WAND, a partnership, d/b/a THE EXCHANGE,
Defendants and
Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
* * * * * *

NATURE OF THE CASE
On November 1, 1974, plaintiff sued the defendants as a
partnership doing business as "The Exchange,11 for the reasonable
value of materials furnished and labor performed upon real property
leased by the defendants.

The Complaint stated two claims for re-

lief, one pursuant to Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and the other in quantum meruit.
Plaintiff alleged that the defendants as a partnership
had an interest in land at the time a contract to improve their
leasehold interest was entered into.

The defendants denied the

allegation in a verified motion to dismiss wherein it was stated:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

That they were not, nor had ever been a partnership,

a joint venture or a d/b/a;
2.

That they had never done business as The Exchange;

3.

That The Exchange was a non-profit corporation; and

4.

That the defendants individually had never contracted

with plaintiff or with anyone.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The parties supplemented the pleadings with affidavits
and exhibits and a hearing was held.

The trial court dismissed

the Complaint and action as to the three defendants/ determined
that The Exchange Place Social Association, a non-profit corporation was the "proper defendant" and granted plaintiff 10 days
to refile its action.

From a final order or judgment of dismis-

sal in favor of the defendants, plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the final order of the lower
court and a determination by this Court that its Complaint states
a claim upon which relief can be granted and that genuine issues
of material fact exist.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In January, 1973, in company with Dan Losee, an architect who had been employed by Stanley Adams, Ben Holbrook, Presi-

2
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dent of Holbrook Company, plaintiff, visited the Intermountain
Stock Exchange Building at the invitation of Mr. Losee for the
purpose of discussing a contract for remodeling the premises for
a business for defendant Adams.

(R. 12)

In February, 1973, at the invitation of Raymond Jones,
an architect employed by defendant Adams, Mr. Holbrook again
visited the said premises for the purpose of determining needed
remodeling on said business.

(R. 12)

The Complaint alleges that

the premises which were visited by Mr. Holbrook and the architects
is commonly known as 39 Exchange Place, and that the defendants
had a leasehold interest in said real property.

(R. 1) The certi-

ficate of doing business under an assumed name lists the defendants
as doing business as The Exchange, which is located at 39 Exchange
Place.

(R. 37)
After said February visit, Holbrook Company was in-

structed by architect Jones to proceed with the design of the
project and time was accrued to the job prior to the commencement
of construction in May of 1973.

(R. 13)

The Exchange Place Social Association filed Articles of
Incorporation with the Secretary of State and was incorporated on
May 4, 1973.

(R. 29)

On May 9, 1973, a certificate was filed with

the Secretary of State wherein Stanley S. Adams, as trustee, certified
that Stanley S. Adams, Von H. Whitby, and Tony M. Wand were carrying
on, conducting or transacting business under an assumed name of The
Exchange.

(R. 36 & 37)
3
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The Complaint alleges that plaintiff completed its contract and was not paid the reasonable value of labor performed and
materials supplied to said real property.

The Complaint further

alleges that the defendants are partners, that they were doing
business as The Exchange, that they contracted to have the building altered or repaired, that they did not post a bond to insure
that plaintiff would be paid, and that they should therefore be held
personally liable as provided in Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953.

(R. 1 & 2)
Prior to the hearing of defendants1 motion to dismiss,

the record was supplemented with the affidavit of plaintiffs
President, setting forth the facts aforesaid.

(R. 12 & 13)

At

the time of the hearing, plaintiff further supplemented the record
by introducing a copy of a certificate of doing business under an
assumed name filed with the Secretary of State on May 9, 1973.
36 & 37)

(R.

The defendants also offered into evidence a copy of the

Articles of Incorporation of The Exchange Place Social Association,
(R. 29-33) and a copy of the certificate regarding doing business
under an assumed name filed December 7, 1974.

(R. 34-35)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST THESE
DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
In order for a complaint to state a claim for relief
under Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it, " . . . shall
4
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contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled."

These basic

requirements are to advise the opponent and the court of the
issues raised, Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275,
277 (1960), and are restricted to the task of general notice-giving.
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(a); Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah
2d 157, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955).
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges facts constituting a
short and plain statement of a claim either under Section 14-2-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or in quantum meruit.
allegations supporting either claim are:

The essential

(1) that the defendants

are partners doing business as The Exchange, 39 Exchange Place;
(2) that the defendants are owners of a leasehold interest in real
property at said location; (3) that the defendant Stanley S. Adams
entered into a contract of $500.00 or more to construct, add to,
alter or repair said property; (4) that defendants failed to post
a bond as required by Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; .
(5) that plaintiff furnished materials and performed labor on said
property; (6) that plaintiff has not been paid the reasonable value
thereof; and (7) that defendants will be unjustly enriched if plaintiff is not paid.

Clearly, two alternate claims showing the pleader

is entitled to relief are stated in plaintiff's Complaint.

5
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Plaintiff submitted an affidavit and other evidence which
substantiates the aforesaid claims.

The affidavit of plaintiff's

President shows that Stanley S. Adams, through his architect, contracted to have said property altered or improved.

Furthermore,

the affidavit points out that said contract was entered into and
services were accrued to the job prior to the date of incorporation
of The Exchange Place Social Association.

(R. 12 & 13)

The certi-

ficate of assumed name filed May 9, 1973, further supports the Complaint's allegations that the defendants were doing business under
the assumed name of The Exchange, located at 39 Exchange Place.
(R. 36 & 37)

Thus, alternate claims were stated against these de-

fendants , and thereafter substantiated in opposition to defendants'
verified motion to dismiss. Therefore, a motion to dismiss could
not be granted where these alleged facts are presumed to be true.
See Petersen v. Jones, infra.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GRANTING THE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS.
The defendants' motion does not state with particularity
that it is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, but it must be assumed to be the case since that motion
is the "usual and proper method of testing the legal sufficiency
of the complaint."

2A Moore, Federal Practice 2266 (2d Ed. 1974).

6
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It is unclear from the record whether the trial court treated the
defendants1 "motion to dismiss" solely as a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, or as a motion for summary judgment under said Rule and
under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 12(b) gives the

trial court discretion to receive matters not contained in the pleadings and to treat it as a motion to dismiss or one for summary judgment.

2A Moore, Federal Practice 2300 (2d Ed. 1974); Hill v. Grand

Central, Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970).

Rule 12(b)

states in part:
Every defense, in law or in fact, to a claim
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third party claim,
shall be asserted in responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the
pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, . . . .
If, on a motion asserting
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such motion
by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.)
The record makes no mention of a granting of summary
judgment, but states, " . . . that Plaintifffs Complaint and causes
of action . . . are hereby dismissed against . • . " the defendants,
with 10 days to refile.

(R. 17)

The court neither expressly excluded

nor included from its consideration affidavits and other materials
7
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submitted to the court which are outside of the pleadings.
Minute Entry and Order of Court.

(R. 14 & 17)

(See

The order of denial

of the motion to reconsider makes mention of "evidence" having
been presented to the court. Whether the court considered this
evidence when it made its prior ruling is unknown.

However, whether

the court treated the defendants1 motion to dismiss solely under
Rule 12(b)(6), or as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(b)
and Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is moot because the
court erred under either rule.
A.

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under

Rule 12(b)(6).
If the court dismissed plaintiff's Complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), it clearly was in error.
In Petersen v. Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 396 P.2d 748 (1964), the court
states the well-settled rule:
The motion to dismiss challenges only the
sufficiency of the complaint, and as against
such a motion, its allegations must be taken
as true.
On appeal from a 12(b) motion to dismiss, the appellate court must
accept plaintiff's allegations of fact as true, together with such
reasonable inferences as may be drawn in plaintiff's favor. Murry
v. City of Milford, Connecticut, 380 F.2d 468, 470 (CA. 2d 1967).
This Court has stated in Stevens v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 24 Utah
2d 214, 469 P.2d 3, 4 (1970) that:
8
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A complaint does not fail to state a claim
unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in
support of the claim.
The allegations of plaintiff's Complaint in the case at bar accepted
as true, clearly state a claim against said defendants under Section
14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, or in quantum meruit as more
specifically set forth under Point I, supra.
Where the court exercises its discretion under Rule 12(b),
excludes supplemental evidence, and does not treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider only
the pleadings, and may not consider affidavits or evidence outside
the pleadings:

Grand Opera Company v. Twentieth Century Fox Film

Corp,, 235 F.2d 303, 307 (CA. 7th 1956); Williford v. People of
California, 352 F.2d 474, 475 (9th Cir. 1965).

In the present case,

the record includes evidence outside the allegations contained in
the pleadings.

Defendants filed a verified motion to dismiss. Plain-

tiff prior to the hearing date served an affidavit opposing the motion.

The trial court could not give credence to the defendants1

verified motion over the allegations of the complaint without considering plaintiff's affidavit too.
(9th Cir. 1960).

Cohen v. Cahill, 281 F.2d 879

If this is done, the trial court is required to

proceed under the provisions of Rule 56.
The trial court could not have given credence to the defendants ' verified motion over the mere allegations of plaintiff's
Complaint.

In Chappell et al v. Goltsman et al, 186 F.2d 215, 218
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(5th Cir. 1950), the court held that the motion to dismiss turned
into one for summary judgment where a motion was supported by affidavits which disputed the allegations of plaintiff's Complaint,
The Chappell court stated:
Rule 12(b) clearly permits a defendant to
raise affirmative defenses in bar by a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and vests the court with discretion
to treat such a motion as one for summary
judgment. But disputed issues of fact
cannot be resolved by affidavits nor may
affidavits be treated for purposes of a
motion for summary judgment as proof contrary to well-pleaded facts in the complaint.
(Emphasis Added.)
Plaintiff's Complaint contains sufficient facts to state a claim
and to raise issues when compared with the defendants' verified
motion to dismiss. More so is the case when supplemental evidence
introduced by plaintiff is considered together with the allegations
of fact in plaintiff's Complaint.

If this is done, however, the

court must proceed under Rule 56. Nevertheless, if this court
determines that the trial court looked only to the pleadings and
granted defendants1 motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
it should find that the trial court erred because the allegations
of the Complaint must be taken as true for purposes of such a
motion.
B.

Summary Judgment Under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56.

If it is found that outside matters were considered by
the trial court, error was committed because a motion to dismiss
was granted when genuine issues of material fact were raised by the
10
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pleadings and the outside matters contained in the record. (See
Point III for issues raised.) If the trial court chose to consider
the materials contained in the record, then Rule 56, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, must apply.

Rule 12(b) states in part:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading
are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such motion
by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.)
The general rule is that if the court does not exclude outside matters, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. The
case of Erlich v. Glasner, 374 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1962), held
that it was error to dismiss an amended complaint as to all defendants upon filing of a motion to dismiss, where the trial court in
its order stated that it had considered all written documents on
file and where the trial court had not entered an order expressly
excluding the affidavit filed in support of the motion.

The appel-

late court went on to hold that the trial court was therefore required to treat the motion as one for summary judgment and was
required to give all parties reasonable opportunity to submit all
material facts pertinent to such motion made.
As to the manner of submitting those facts, and the standard by which to test them, Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
states in part:
11
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The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 384 F.2d 935 (CA. 9th 1967),
Cert. Denied, 390 U.S. 987 (1968), the appellate court disregarded
the label that the district court put upon its disposition and held
that whenever outside matters are presented to the court and not
excluded, the requirements of summary judgment rule must be met.
Thus, if such matters are considered and on appeal it appears that
there was a triable issue of fact, the judgment will be reversed.

POINT III
,

THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT BEFORE THE
COURT AND THEREFORE THIS CASE SHOULD BE REVERSED.
The record contains outside matters, (R. 4, 5, 12, 13,

29-37) which divulge numerous genuine issues of material fact that
are triable.

The trial court did not expressly exclude these out-

side matters, and therefore, Rule 56 requirements must be met.
The issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.

Whether plaintiff contracted with defendants, or any

of them, or the agent of any of them, prior to incorporation by
the defendants of The Exchange Place Social Association.
The affidavit of Ben Holbrook shows that two architects
hired by Stanley S. Adams made contact with Holbrook Company and
12
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instructed plaintiff to commence work prior to the date that The
Exchange Place Social Association was even incorporated.

(R. 12)

These facts show the formation of a contract with an individual,
Stanley S. Adams, prior to incorporation of the alleged proper
party.

The certificate of assumed name, signed by Stanley S. Adams,

(R. 34 & 35), tends to substantiate the fact that Mr. Adams was
doing business in a capacity other than as an agent for a corporation.

This is in direct opposition to paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of

the verified motion to dismiss, (R. 4 & 5) and therefore genuine
issues of material fact are raised.
2.

Whether the defendants, or any of them, did business

as The Exchange prior to the aforesaid date of incorporation, and
at the time the contract was entered into.
The d/b/a certificate, (R. 36 & 37) shows that at least
Stanley S. Adams may have been doing business as The Exchange prior
to the date of incorporation of The Exchange Place Social Association and was legally doing business as The Exchange on May 9, 1973,
and thereafter.

In fact, The Exchange Place Social Association was

not legally doing business under any assumed name until December 2,
1974, when a d/b/a certificate was filed with the Secretary of State.
(R. 34 & 35)

The filing of that certificate at such a date was an

attempt by the defendants to cloud the matter and to insert a corporation as a defendant where three individuals were in fact liable
and had done business as The Exchange for a lengthy period of time
as evidenced by the d/b/a certificate on file from May 9, 1973, until
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I

I
at least November 21, 1974. The foregoing is in opposition to para-

I

graphs 1 and 3 of the motion to dismiss, and therefore genuine issues
of fact are raised,
3.

I

Whether prior to the aforesaid date the defendants,

or any of them, were associated together as a joint venture or

I

partnership.

i

The d/b/a certificate, (R. 37) lists the names of three
people, the defendants named in this action, who are to do business

I

under the assumed name of The Exchange, which is not a corporation.
It is true that only Stanley S. Adams signed the certificate, but

I

the question is raised as to whether the two other individuals were

i

doing business in a partnership along with Stanley S. Adams.

This

fact contradicts paragraphs 2 and 3 of the motion to dismiss, and

I

therefore raises genuine issues of material fact.
4. Also at issue is the question of the relationship
between the defendants prior to the incorporation of The Exchange

|
•

Place Social Association, at which time plaintiff had already
commenced work to improve the leasehold.

I

Nowhere in the record is it denied that the defendants,
nor any one of them, had a leasehold interest in the real property

|

commonly known as 39 Exchange Place.

i

The leasehold interest is

alleged in the Complaint, and through affidavit, it is indicated
that the plaintiff visited the premises which Mr. Adams controlled
or had some interest in prior to the time The Exchange Place Social
Association was incorporated.

(R. 12 & 13)

The premises were lo-

14
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|

cated at 39 Exchange Place, the address given for The Exchange,
d/b/a Stanley S. Adams.

(R. 36 & 37)

Therefore, genuine issues

of material fact are raised here.
In light of these numerous material facts that are genuinely at issue, in order for the trial court to have granted summary
judgment, it must have determined these facts in defendants1 favor.
This it cannot do!
Summary judgment is never used to determine
what the facts are, but only to ascertain
whether there are any material issues of
fact in dispute. If there be any such disputed issues of fact, they cannot be resolved
by summary judgment . . . . Hill v. Grand
Central, Inc., 25 U.2d 121, 477 P.2d 150,
151 (1970).
Moreover, in Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d
420, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (1966), this Court stated that a motion for
summary judgment is "a harsh measure" and that for this reason
an opposing party's contentions "must be considered in a light
most advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in favor of
permitting him to go to trial."
The court clearly erred upon granting the defendants'
motion where such issues clearly exist, and therefore the case
should be reversed and remanded to trial for a determination
on those issues.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

Plaintiff claims that the defendants are per-
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sonally liable for the reasonable value of materials and supplies
furnished to property leased by them.

Material issues of fact

were raised by outside matter not excluded by the court.

It would

be unjust to permit the defendants to substitute a corporation in
their stead after plaintiff commenced work so as to avoid personal
responsibility for their contracts.

This court should reverse

the District Court's order for the reasons stated herein.
DATED: May 21, 1975
Respectfully submitted,
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD
By F. Burton Howard
By Charles C. Brown
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Holbrook Company
1000 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that three true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant Holbrook Company were mailed to
Mr. John S. Adams, Attorney for Defendants-Respondents, Suite 200,
The Glass Factory, Arrow Press Square, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101,
this {JLf

day of May, 1975, by First Class, postage prepaid mail.
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